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Abstract
Wargames were originally created to test wartime strategies against opposing
forces within a short time frame. Due to the short duration design of these wargames,
logistics were deemed irrelevant and it was incorrectly assumed that the warfighter
would be logistically supported for the entire duration of the wargame. The pur-
pose of this thesis is to provide insight to the value of capturing logistics within a
wargame and to better model the increased requirement for Agile Combat Support.
This research utilizes a logistics simulation tool and its outputs to conduct statisti-
cal analyses comparing a baseline scenario created to mirror the Joint Strike Fighter
key performance parameters and a modified model with increased operations tempo.
Additionally, an experimental design provides key insight to the primary factors con-
tributing to the changes in essential measures of effectiveness. This research identifies
statistically significant differences between the baseline and modified models and finds
the most essential components for Agile Combat Support are the number of spares,
the number of maintenance personnel, and sortie duration. Incorporating logistics in
wargames provides a more holistic view of a war and can be the crucial addition to
wargames that helps the USAF maintain dominance in air, space, and cyberspace.
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LOGISTICS SIMULATION FOR LONG DURATION LOGISTICS WARGAMES
I. Introduction
This thesis provides insight to the value of modeling the effects of logistics within a
combat model or wargame. Wargaming encapsulates the concept of simulating reality
in order to assess a unit’s strength or impact on a war and to provide an alternative
for battle commanders to enhance the quality of their decisions made during war time.
Wargames have been used throughout the history of warfare. From games created
by the early Chinese military General Sun Tzu to current super computer warfare
simulations, wargames and warfare strategies have substantially progressed. Despite
the evolution of the types and complexity of wartime simulations, an omnipresent flaw
in wargames is the omission of logistics from these warfare models. Neglecting logistics
can be catastrophic to the warfighter. Especially with current budgetary constraints,
battle commanders are not only required to be cognizant of the logistical ramifications
of war time decisions, but also account for the supplies necessary to maintain the
United States Air Force’s (USAF) dominance in air, space, and cyberspace.
1.1 Problem Background
Historically, wargames consistently overestimate the capabilities of Blue Forces,
United States Forces, and underestimate the constraints limiting the Blue Force. This
problem is even more inflated when considering logistics within a wargame. With an
exception to a few models specifically created for logistics support, wargames do not
consider logistic demands and constraints for either Blue or Red (Enemy) Forces. The
assumption that logistics will support the warfighter might hold true for a quick and
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easy war, but recent history proved that this is not the case. Historically, most wars
require logistics support over a long duration of time. As a result, Air Force Material
Command (AFMC) Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection (A4) is seeking a
way to properly or more realistically model logistics within a wargame to gain more
accurate insight to the Blue Force capability.
1.2 Research Objectives
The objective for this research is to answer the following questions:
1. How do prolonged surge operations impact the supply of parts, mainte-
nance personnel utilization and the number of aircraft that are not mission
capable due to supply (NMCS)?
2. What impact on sortie operations do the number of spare JSF engine
modules and maintenance personnel have?
This research uses a logistics simulation tool, the Logistics Composite Model
(LCOM) Analysis Tool Kit (ATK), to compare multiple models, specifically focusing
on sortie rate, manpower utilization and the failure of missions due to unscheduled
maintenance. Analysis is conducted to distinguish the differences between a baseline
model and a modified model with a higher OPSTEMPO. The baseline model is de-
rived from the key performance parameters (KPP) for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
program and the modified model alters the length and intensity of surge operations.
Furthermore, this research performs a design of experiments to analyze different al-
location levels of spare parts and maintenance personnel under different demands in
sortie length. The goal of this research is to provide some measures of the difference
in logistical requirements between the current accepted surge period and the longer
surge operation. In addition, this research aims to provide insight on reasonable levels
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of spare modules and maintenance personnel to adequately sustain the JSF mission
over a sustained period of time.
1.3 Research Scope
This research is not directed at a specific approach to incorporate logistics into
wargames, but rather focuses on and explores the potential impact of a more restricted
logistics supply over a prolonged period with higher OPSTEMPO. This thesis is not
attempting to establish a new definition for surge operations and their intensity, but
rather explore the possibility of more prolonged and intense surge and sustainment
operations. Additionally, a more detailed look at the JSF engine and its spare parts
are analyzed to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the logistic support of
a fighter squadron. This research not only enlightens readers about the complete
disregard for incorporating logistics into wargames, but also provides essential insight
to a more realistic look at logistics and the true capabilities of the Blue Force.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides back-
ground to wargames and logistics and reviews relevant research in the field that
influences our examination of the problem. Chapter 3 presents the methodologies ap-
plied in this research. Chapter 4 presents the results and analysis of our simulations,
as well as analysis on the outputs from the simulations. Chapter 5 summarizes the
contributions of this research and proposes directions for further studies.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this literature review is to introduce and outline key points of
several pieces of literature in relation to the incorporation of logistics into or alongside
wargames. This literature review begins by outlining and summarizing wargames and
their application to the United States Air Force (USAF). Secondly, this literature
review highlights the absence of logistics in current wargames, as well as how the lack
of logistics impacts decision making. Additionally, the necessity for Repair Network
Integration (RNI) is addressed along with past attempts to integrate repair networks
in simulation. Finally, this literature review covers the Logistics Composite Model
(LCOM) Analysis Tool Kit (ATK), its utility and its applicability to this topic.
2.2 Wargames
History of Wargames.
Wargames have been used throughout history, dating all the way back to ancient
China. More than five thousand years ago Sun Tzu created a game called Wei Hai
which was a board game designed to allow players to practice encircling or outflanking
their opponent [1]. Although Wei Hai is a simplified version of a wargame, the
development of wargames did not stop there. Some people believe the next evolution
of wargames which gained larger interest was the ancient Indian game of war in which
the pieces represented various components of armies on the battlefield [2]. Others
believe it was the Koenigspel which was invented in a German town in 1664 and
involved more pieces and a larger board than modern chess.
These types of wargames were very simplistic in which the pieces represent indi-
vidual actors in a wargame, where it wasn’t until 1781 until wargames employed the
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concepts of aggregating a large number of people into one piece [1]. In late 1781,
John Clerk, a Scotsman, developed a method for using model ships to gain tacti-
cal insights [2]. The continuation of modifications to wargames did not stop here.
In 1811, the birth of modern wargaming appeared with the creativity of a Prussian
Army Lieutenant by the name Georg Leopold von Reisswitz. He constructed a table
model of the actual terrain and used blocks to represent units of soldiers. There were
two players in this wargame with one umpire or official. The umpire would update
the table and inform the players the ramifications of the previous decision. The um-
pire would use complex tables of data to determine casualties and would even use
the roll of a dice to model the uncertainties of the battlefield [3]. Over the next two
hundred years these umpires often turned into computers and more aspects of the
battlefield were able to be modeled and more uncertainty was able to be entered into
the model. As seen in the examples above, wargaming was used throughout history
as a fundamental tool in developing and practicing military strategy.
Defining Wargames.
The United States Air Force defines wargames as “a simulation, by whatever
means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, using rules,
data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation” [4].
Wargames are very similar to simulations and are, in fact, just a specific type of sim-
ulation where there are actors or players making real time decisions which ultimately
alter the outcomes of the simulation. “A simulation is an operating representation of
selected features of real-world or hypothetical events and processes. It is conducted in
accordance with known or assumed procedures and data, and with the aid of methods
and equipment ranging from the simplest to the most sophisticated” [4]. A simula-
tion has inputs and outputs and provides similar results every time depending on the
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randomness of the events occurring within a stochastic simulation.
Wargames utilize simulations to investigate or train the interactions between two
opposing decision makers. This decision making is what distinguishes a wargame from
a simulation. Having these decision makers present produces unique unrepeatable
simulations. The human in the loop allows wargames to be unpredictable and deviate
from the mundane rules and algorithms utilized by computer simulations [5]. “Good
wargames must be structured to help human players make decisions and allow them
to learn about the effects of those decisions” [2]. Wargames are extremely useful to
train or test strategies which would allocate real forces, weapons or other resources
which are expensive or irreplaceable. Another utility wargames provide is the ability
to simulate real life scenarios without any ramifications, damage or even loss of life
these scenarios induce. This opportunity afforded to the decision makers provides
priceless information and training which would not be received any other way other
than a real life situation. “When it works, wargaming can appear almost magical in
its power to inform and instruct” [6] and it doesnt expend the resources necessary for
the game.
Modern Wargames.
“[T]he Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 gave the service chiefs responsibility under
U.S. Code Title 10 to train, man, and equip their individual forces” [7]. “Title 10
wargames can be defined as a series of major service-sponsored wargames that address
future concepts and capabilities in the context of Title 10 responsibilities to organize,
train, and equip its forces to carry out its roles and functions as a component of
the national instrument of power” [7]. The Air Force began conducting Title 10
wargames in 1995 by creating two types of wargames: Unified Engagement (UE) and
Future Capabilities Game [7]. UE wargames are completed on even years with Future
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Capabilities Games being held on odd years. UE is conducted at alternating locations
between the European and Pacific theaters. There are three teams or forces involved
with these wargames: white, blue and red. The white team consists of the judges;
the Blue Force represents the United States forces while the Red Force represents a
generalized opponent force [3]. Similar to wargames throughout history, the players
during these wargames are the decision makers. These players use history, culture
and doctrine to develop strategies for the tactical level [3].
Future Games are conducted in odd years at Air Force Wargaming Institute
(AFWI) at Maxwell AFB [5]. While UE is focused to address military challenges
and concept exploration, AF Future Games are focused to address future concepts
and force structure alternatives (SECAF, 2012). The Air Force Future Games explore
future capabilities as far as 20 years into the future. The Air Force Research Lab
(AFRL) assists the design and analysis of the highly analytical game. Compared to
Unified Engagement, Air Force Future Games create a balance between educational
and analytical purposes [7]. One of the downfalls of Title 10 wargames is designing
a game for all purposes would require an enormous amount of resources. The size,
cost and complexity all inhibit the accuracy and computation time of the wargame.
That may be why the Global games of old used to have hundreds of players and
adjudicators and last multiple weeks [7].
2.3 Incorporation of Logistics, Or Lack Thereof
One of the main issues of UE is a failure to evaluate the logistic operations [8].
This statement holds true for any wargame currently being used by the United States
Department of Defense. Typically logistics is regarded as an operational constraint
in wargames and, as a result, wargames tend to avoid how incorporating logistics
impacts campaign planning [9]. Other reasons that logistics has failed to be captured
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in wargames is largely due to logisticians and warfighters being excluded from the
wargames [9]. Without the insight and information provided by logisticians, wargames
were oblivious to combat consumption, transportation, industrial base, maintenance,
and regeneration of ordnance, as well as command and control [9].
Wargames are a critical asset for training and executing command-level decisions.
Wargames are extremely valuable and useful tools, but the necessity of incorporating
logistics into these wargames is equally important. The role of logistics is to further
define a mirrored representation of Blue Force capabilities by providing limitations
and constraints to the wargames[5]. Wargames are a pertinent tool for the Depart-
ment of Defense, but without these limitations and constraints provided by logistics,
wargames depreciate in value and may provide inaccurate insight.
Fortunately, over the past decade, logisticians were considered during wargames.
However, despite the addition of these logisticians, logistics is still not being simu-
lated in wargames. “Blue Forces overestimate their effectiveness level and completely
disregard the logistics involved in supporting their campaign” [5]. For example, the
kill rates included in the wargame simulations require that munitions be provided
for each of the weapon systems. However, the amount of ammunition available is
limitless and consumption is not tracked [8]. “This in turn over predicts the effec-
tiveness of US forces, under predicts the red forces, underestimates the budget, and
provides less insightful results to a large number of policies and doctrine” [5]. The
primary reason this is continually happening refers back to Ducharme: the size, cost
and complexity of wargames is too great to evolve the current wargames and incor-
porate another large aspect of the war simulation, logistics. “But what senior leaders
fail to understand is that funding a project to develop and maintain logistics within
a wargame simulation model is far less expensive than underestimating the budget
for a war in the Pacific” [5].
8
Past.
John Long (1993) wrote a thesis focusing on the Surge and Sustainment Simulation
(S3) which was an initial push to address the complication of incorporating logistics in
wargame. The Wargames Department at Naval War College needed a computer model
to simulate “theater level logistics to generate wargame ‘ground truth’ and to aid
players in simple planning” [10]. As a response, S3 fulfilled the required characteristics
to allow the Naval War College to add logistical constraints to their wargames. Like
all wargames over the course of history, there is always room for improvement.
Curtis Plunk (1995) wrote a thesis focusing on The Logistics Wargaming Sim-
ulation (LogWarS). LogWarS was “a computer program designed to facilitate the
incorporation of logistics considerations and constraints into wargames played at the
Wargaming Department of the Naval War College” [1]. Very similar to S3, LogWarS
allows an umpire of a wargame to create a scenario with forces and operating bases
with the logistical constraints for their supply and transportation of assets. The simu-
lation has the ability to pause, collect user input or modifications to the scenario, and
resume the wargame simulation. The largest improvement to S3 which LogWarS con-
tributed was a new graphical interface to follow the supply status of forces and bases
[1]. Despite these modifications and alterations to the computer program, logistics
still was not being fully incorporated into command-level decision making.
Present.
In 2014, Daniel Krievs addressed the failure of incorporating logistics into wargames,
specifically Title 10 wargames. With the use of a stochastic discrete-event simulation
tool, LCOM ATK, Krievs was able to “design, analyze and demonstrate that logistics
can and should be incorporated into wargames” [5]. Statistical analysis was used to
evaluate the effectiveness of sortie missions under logistical constraints. This analysis
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could be conducted prior to, or upon completion of, the wargame. Unfortunately, the
aforementioned restraints such as size, cost and complexity inhibit the use of a more
realistic, complex LCOM ATK model during wargames. The decision makers need
timely results from the logistics model in order to keep up with the time frame of the
wargame and complete it in a timely manner. In order to accomplish this, multivari-
ate analysis techniques were used to develop a meta-model simply using four metrics
to successfully predict measures of effectiveness [5]. This meta-model could then be
run during a wargame to provide more timely results while incorporating logistics.
The S3 and LogWarS were separate logistics simulation programs which were com-
pleted at the conclusion of a wargame. There was minimal success with this approach
because feasibility results are provided several days after the wargame is completed.
This approach doesn’t allow Blue Force commanders to alter their approach and
retest their updated strategies in the wargame scenario [5]. However, the simulation
programs highlighted interesting results by omitting logistics from wargames which
drew attention to the incorporation of logistics within wargames. Their main con-
tribution to wargames was disproving that unlimited resources provides a feasible
solution. While these are great results and help advance this field of study, it still
leaves the fundamental issue with running a separate logistics simulation model after
the wargame has concluded [5].
Up to this point, the most applicable approach to incorporate logistics into wargames
would be to run a logistics simulation prior to a wargame. “This allows for ACS to
provide further representation of Blue Forces and provide more meaningful insights
from wargames by allowing commanders to alter their strategies during the wargame”
[5]. Additionally, it is possible for multiple various scenarios to be run through the
logistics simulations to try to consider the possible decisions made by commanders
during wargames. Ultimately, running a logistics simulation model prior to a wargame
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provides plenty of time to modify, complete and analyze the separate logistics models
and inform the decision makers in a timely manner [5].
Future.
Idealistically, the best approach would be to run the wargame and a logistics sim-
ulation model simultaneously or in the same model. However, this is not an easy task
because of the conflicting aggregation levels between logistic simulations and com-
bat models. “This conflict comes down to a difference in metrics and processes that
might not have the ability to communicate with each other within a single simulation
platform” [5]. Despite these large obstacles, the massive benefit of providing instan-
taneous results to decision makers is extremely coveted. Being able to view supply
levels, system failures, aircraft availability, and more during a wargame is extremely
more realistic.
In addition, running logistics within a wargame would require commanders to
provide near real-time decisions with a larger amount of constraints or restrictions.
For example, during a large-scale real-world disaster, decision mak-
ers will face emotional and psychological stresses as well as operational
challenges. Strictly intellectual exercises, including simple, scenario-based
planning, seldom create emotional or psychological stress. Indeed, no
planning system or training tool can cover every possible contingency or
produce the same stresses experienced in reality. Real people do not die
in wargames. Nevertheless, effective high-engagement games can equip
leaders better to confront whatever contingency they must actually face,
regardless of its similarity in detail to the game actually played. Lead-
ers responsible for making crisis decisions and living with their conse-
quences will benefit from the synthetic experience derived from playing
high-engagement games–as well as from the additional mental tools they
can develop through that experience–to help ready themselves for con-
fronting those challenges. [6]
Running a model which includes logistics into the wargame would be monumental,
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but this still leaves the issue of long run times. Constructing a single wargame model
that captures attrition, decision making, and logistics is currently not feasible due to
these and other constraining factors [5].
2.4 Repair Network Integration
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations and Mission Support, Lt.
Gen. Judith Fedder, declares in AFI20-117 “The Repair Network will accomplish the
Intermediate-level and Depot-level maintenance and repair of aircraft and reparable
assets required to fulfill operational needs outside the capability and/or capacity of
the Mission Generation Network” [11]. This AFI concentrates on the implementation
of repair networks through the use of a new management specifically created to or-
ganize the RNI management process. A Repair Network (RN) provides a centralized
management for aircraft repairs. The RN is comprised of globally distributed repair
facilities (or nodes) to enable quick and versatile response to meet the demands of the
sortie generation process. The primary goal for the RN is to support the warfighter
and deliver optimized aircraft/weapons system availability at the same or reduced
cost. In order to do so, Lt. Gen. Fedder tasked the Air Force Material Command
Director of Logistics (AFMC/A4) to lead, coordinate, and plan RNI implementation
of standard processes, reporting processes, management plans, systems, training and
most importantly tools related to Repair Network Management [11].
In response to the Expeditionary Logistics for the 21st Century (eLog21), RAND
conducted analysis of a repair network in 2010. Their primary focus was to analyze
the efficiency of establishing Central Repair Facilities (CRFs) and how it would save
the Air Force time, money and personnel. RAND enumerated the current process for
Air Force Maintenance, determined the weapon-system requirements and workload,
analyzed the optimal allocations of workloads between a unit and repair network and
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evaluated the efficiency of consolidating maintenance facilities specifically for the F-
16, KC-135, and C-130 platforms. In order to do so, RAND utilized the capabilities
of LCOM ATK to define the unit-repair capabilities, the distribution of each center’s
workload personnel utilization, and personnel levels. As a result of their analysis,
RAND concluded that consolidated wing-level scheduled inspections and component
back-shop maintenance capabilities were far more efficient than the current layout of
Air Force maintenance operations [12].
The principal objective for RNI is to transform the current maintenance manage-
ment process to improve efficiency while meeting the requirements of the warfighter.
Lt. Gen. Fedder concentrates part of the AFI to the management of a RN, but as-
pects of RN to be considered in the field of analysis is component repair, depot-level
reparables (DLRs), and modifications. Metrics such as availability, performance, and
affordability should be considered and used as a diagnostic tool to aid decision mak-
ing. In order to support the initiative of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, through
the tasking of Lt. Gen. Fedder, a tool should be built to collect these metrics, provide
insight, conduct analysis and present significant results to better the decision making
process. The most widely used logistics simulation tool across the Air Force that can
be used to provide this analysis and insight is LCOM ATK.
2.5 LCOM ATK Model
LCOM ATK is a detailed simulation model that identifies the effect of logistics
resources (primarily maintenance personnel, equipment, facilities, and spare parts) on
sortie generation [12]. Another, more technical, definition for the LCOM ATK model
is “a stochastic, discrete-event simulation that relies on probabilities and random
number generators to model scenarios,(LCOM) is one of the Air Forces primary tools
for determining optimal logistics and maintenance manpower levels” [13]. “LCOM
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ATK supports and integrates the many complex tasks required to run LCOM into
a single suite of tools” [14]. This model can be extremely powerful for the fight to
incorporate logistics into wargames. The following chapter discusses our use of LCOM
ATK as the primary tool in our methodology for incorporating logistics in wargames.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
Past research indicates a superseding necessity for logistics and provides awareness
to its impact on the feasibility of decisions made during wargames. This research not
only continues to illustrate the necessity for logistics in relevant wargames, but also
explores the possibility of tighter constraints on resources, as well as a higher and
more prolonged OPSTEMPO within a Long Duration Logistics Wargame (LDLW)
through use of a separate logistics simulation.
3.2 LDLW Overview
AFMC/A4F and Frontier Technologies Inc. sponsored the first LDLW work-
shop in order to examine, validate and quantify logistics and sustainment gaps and
shortfalls within Agile Combat Support (ACS). As a research focus of AFMC/A4F,
LDLW provides the ability to analyze the logistics incorporated with decisions made
in wargames over a long period of time. Typically wargames span a 7-10 day period
of time, but LDLW is designed to cover upwards of 180 days. This longer duration
wargame not only provides logistics feedback for the initial surge and establishment
of air superiority, but also considers the required logistics to maintain air superiority
and sustain air operations throughout an extended period of conflict.
Booz Allen Hamilton conducted the first LDLW workshop in September 2015
at the Simulation and Analysis Facility at Wright Patterson Air Force Base. This
workshop combined the superior intellect of the maintenance community, pilots, con-
tractors and other personnel. Each member of the workshop had a unique background
which enabled them to provide opinions other members may have never considered.
The discussions during this workshop provided valuable opinions about the key con-
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tributing logistics factors to consider during a wargame. More details on this work-
shop can be found in the after action report[15].
3.3 RNI Overview
The Repair Network Integration (RNI) concept provides a centralized manage-
ment and location for aircraft repairs beyond the existing Air Logistic Centers (ALC).
Additionally, RNI focuses on Intermediate and Depot level maintenance done at a
central repair facility (CRF), as opposed to Organizational level maintenance which
is typically done on the flight line (Fedder, 2013). The concept of RNI and CRFs
was developed to provide a more efficient allocation of resources by consolidating the
depots and repair facilities, along with their management and maintenance personnel,
to reduce cost and time for repairs. Due primarily to software limitations, we do not
consider RNI for our study.
3.4 LCOM ATK Overview
This research utilizes a preexisting logistics model in order to significantly reduce
the cost, complexity and knowledge of incorporating logistics into a wargame model.
This research requires an operational level logistics model to conduct constructive
analysis while considering maintenance personnel and equipment required to capture
Agile Combat Support. LCOM ATK accomplishes all of these requirements and has
been used throughout the logistics community for decades.
The logistics model constructed for this research uses LCOM ATK version 4.2.
AFLCMC/EZJS altered and enhanced the LCOM software tool into LCOM ATK
with support from Frontier Technology Incorporated (FTI). LCOM ATK is a collec-
tion of modules written in SIMSCRIPT II, each with the capability of communicating
with other modules to function as a unit (Erdman, 2014:13). The three models are:
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Figure 1. LCOM Process
the Input Model which preprocesses the data, the Main Model which runs the simu-
lation, and the Post Processor Model which analyzes post simulation data (Erdman,
2014:27). The software tool is utilized across the USAF to simulate studies concerning
AF base level functions like maintenance and supply.
LCOM ATK is an extremely flexible software tool which allows the user to define
the level of detail of the simulation. This flexibility in a tool is extremely beneficial
for logistics simulations because of the conflicting aggregation levels of wargames and
constructive logistics models used for analysis. The LCOM ATK model is designed to
process spares or other similar entities to capture the maintenance or support system
throughout the entirety of a war (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2014). This allows LCOM ATK
users to alter the model to capture a wide range of different types of logistics processes
and resources while maintaining a manageable level of understanding and complexity.
The interaction and order of the three models is shown in Figure 1.
The output of LCOM ATK is consolidated into reports which consist of various
statistics grouped together by type. The three important groups this research focused
on were groups C, D and F which represent key aircraft statistics, manpower statistics,
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and key supply statistics, respectfully. The most important statistics from each of
those groups were selected to form a subset of metrics used for analysis. This subset
of statistics are organized into groups shown in Table 1.
Table 1. LCOM ATK Output Statistics
Stat Description
C3 Percent Sorties
C4 Percent Unscheduled Maintenance
C6 Percent NMCS
C15 Achieved Sorties / Aircraft / Day
C16 Flying Hours
C17 Average Flying Hours / Aircraft / Day
D3 Manhours Used
F3 Number of Backorder Days
F4 Number of Units Demanded
F11 NMCS Indicator
3.5 Logistics Simulation Scenario
This research builds on previous studies and lessons learned from the LDLW work-
shop efforts involving longer wargame scenarios with added logistics capabilities and
constraints. AFMC desires logistics analysis and insight on decisions made for the
“Pivot to the Pacific”. This idea indicates the US shifting focus from the Middle
East and/or the European theater to the Pacific region. Due to security concerns,
the scenario for our wargame is completely fictional. The simulation does not con-
tain any real opposing forces, the sortie times/rates are not real, and the locations
of both Blue and Red Forces are representative of a notational conflict in the Pacific
region. This research aims to provide a proof of concept that a stand-alone logistics
simulation can effectively capture a more accurate and realistic representation of lo-
gistics supply during a high OPSTEMPO war that lasts longer than the traditional
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wargame’s seven to ten day time period.
The scenario takes place in the Pacific with two Blue Force units. These forces
are captured in LCOM ATK with two Blue forward operating bases (FOB) each
conducting F-35 sorties. The two Blue FOBs each contain twenty-four Joint Strike
Fighters (JSF), three maintenance facilities, a minimum of thirty-eight maintenance
crew members, and an extensive amount of parts to repair the JSF. This wargame
scenario is illustrated in Figure 2. For supply processes we focus only on the JSF
engine and its modules, similar to the approach used in the September 2015 LDLW
workshop. JSF engines within LCOM ATK comprise thousands of parts which are
susceptible to fail, but this research focuses specifically on five critical modules: noz-
zle, augmenter, fan, power, and gear box.
Figure 2. Wargame Scenario
This wargame model does not incorporate the interaction between Blue and Red
Forces, but focuses on the predetermined sortie rate and schedule, similar to that
used in the LDLW workshop. The simulation contains a predefined set of Blue Force
strategies to conduct air operations over a 180 day period. Figure 3 illustrates the
sortie operations modeled within LCOM ATK. The Red Forces are not able to attrit
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Blue Forces, however, this could be easily modified within LCOM ATK. This aspect
does not impact the overall objective for this thesis, which is to capture a more
realistic observation of the logistics support for a wargame scenario.
Figure 3. Simulation Operations and Support
This research uses a preexisting JSF logistics model in LCOM ATK that was cre-
ated by Lockheed Martin in order to mirror the requirements laid out in alignment
with key performance parameters (KPP). This research takes advantage of the im-
mense amount of detail this model provides and merely alters small details to tune
the model to accurately represent the aforementioned scenario. In order to create a
baseline scenario for this research, an additional FOB was added to the preexisting
model, but the majority of the logic in the model was left unchanged. A part of
the model logic was modified in the change card to incorporate the use of the five
pertinent modules and their spares in the repair process, instead of only considering
whole engines. Originally, the model designated three spare JSF engines to aid the
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repair process, but after our changes, the model was able to represent three spare
parts for each of the five JSF engine modules. We believe incorporating three spare
parts for each of the modules is equivalent, but more descriptive than the original
design which included three whole JSF engines.
Typically, a war is seen in two phases, the surge phase and the sustainment phase.
Surge operations consist of a higher OPSTEMPO in order to take advantage of bat-
tlefield opportunities, whereas sustainment operations slow the tempo down to a sus-
tainable level where maintenance, manpower and logistics can keep up. The baseline
scenario is programmed for the JSF to fly surge operation sorties for seven days, seize
operation sorties for twenty-three days, and sustainment operation sorties for 150
days. In LCOM ATK, sorties are flown in accordance with a flight schedule and the
logistics and maintenance support of the JSF is monitored. During surge operations
in LCOM ATK sorties are flown every forty minutes for a total of twenty sorties per
day at each FOB. Seize operations consist of fourteen sorties per day starting every
hour and sustainment operations allow two hours between sorties for a total of seven
sorties per day at each FOB. A slight modification to this baseline model was made
in the change card by increasing the duration of the surge and seize periods. The
modified model uses thirty days for both the surge and seize periods and 120 days
for sustainment operations. Instead of flying twenty sorties per day for seven days
and fourteen sorties per day for twenty-three days–a total of 462 sorties per FOB–the
extended surge operation will fly 600 sorties per FOB during the same thirty day
period. These two models comprise the baseline and modified models compared in
our analysis.
The simulation steps 24 hours at a time for a total of 180 days. The 24 hour time
step is used because it is customarily the length for logistic models and similar to how
real world metrics are gathered. This analysis gathers 30 replications worth of data in
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order to provide a reasonable ninety-five percent half width for various statistics. The
baseline model created by Lockheed Martin, with our slight amendments, and our
modified model with prolonged surge and seize periods are compared for statistical
differences in order to answer questions about how successful the Blue Forces would
be with increased sortie rates and duration throughout the surge and seize periods of
a war.
The original idea for the next step of analysis was supposed to include RNI into
a further modified model. Due to the limited amount of time available, as well as
the complexity of incorporating RNI into our existing model, this step was deemed
infeasible. Hopefully with ongoing enhancements, LCOM ATK will soon include an
RNI capability. Instead of an RNI extension to our analysis, we explore the impact
of our newly modeled engine modules.
Knowing the number of spare engine module parts necessary to sustain higher
sortie rates during wartime operations is an extremely valuable piece of information.
Additionally, allocation of military personnel is a critical part of a war. Our research
develops a design of experiments (DOE) with varying levels of number of spare module
parts, number of maintenance personnel, and sortie duration. This DOE not only
answers our imperative questions, but provides information on how the length of
sorties impact key statistics. The next chapter of this thesis analyzes the comparison
of aircraft, manpower and spare part statistics between the baseline model and the
modified model, as well as a DOE using the modified model as described.
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IV. Analysis and Results
In this analysis section we assert the importance of our model to a continual logis-
tics problem of interest to the U.S. military and the wargames it uses. This section of
our research is organized into two sub-categories for the two parts of analysis we out-
lined in Chapter 3. Both parts of this analysis help address the omnipresent issue of
Blue Force logistics constraints being underestimated. The first sub-category focuses
on comparing the mean outputs from the baseline and modified models to portray the
differences in key statistics between a model created by Lockheed Martin to meet the
required JSF KPPs (baseline) and a long duration wargame (modified) model over
the first 30 days of surge operations. The second sub-category further analyzes the
modified model with an experimental design, specifically focusing on the number of
accessible spare JSF engine modules, the number of maintenance personnel available
at both of the FOBs, and the length of sorties flown over the full duration of the 180
day logistics wargame. We examine key measures of effectiveness (MOE) output by
LCOM ATK by varying the levels of these factors, high and low, in order to gather
a broader insight to the modified model and the Blue Force logistical limitations.
4.1 Comparison Analysis
LCOM ATK has the ability to output hundreds of metrics, but this research
focuses on eight metrics that we consider the most important for the analysis we
are conducting. These eight metrics we chosen after observing the LDLW workshop
and talking to subject matter experts (SME) about metrics which encapsulate the
results of the JSF mission and its maintenance and supply support. The simulations
were run thirty times and the data for the eight statistics was saved in a comma
delimited text file, which was easily imported into Microsoft Excel. We chose to
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use Microsoft Excel because the LCOM ATK data output was manageable in size
after we eliminated a significant amount of metrics. Additionally, Microsoft Excel
provides an easy to use interface for organizing data, conducting statistical analysis,
and creating graphical outputs of the data and results of the analysis. Once the data
was imported into Microsoft Excel, we organized the outputs by group, C-Statistics
(Aircraft), D-Statistics (Manpower), and F-Statistics (Supply).
The metrics for the three groups are summarized in Tables 2, 3, and 4. The data
is filtered to include the first thirty days of the simulation, as opposed to the full
180 day output used in the experimental design. The most important comparisons
for the metrics occur within the first thirty days because this analysis focuses on
the extended surge operation from the KPP-based seven days to the LDLW thirty
days. This research compares the combined seven days of surge operations and the
twenty-three day seize period in the baseline model to the thirty day surge period in
the modified model.
The tables are sorted by metric and then further broken down into columns for
the baseline model, modified model and the differences between the two models. The
means and standard deviations are output from LCOM ATK and the half-widths and
two sample confidence intervals seen in the tables were calculated in Microsoft Excel
using a t-distribution with an alpha of 0.05 and twenty-nine degrees of freedom.
The C-Statistics shown in Table 2 are organized with metrics related to the air-
craft. The table is sorted by the metrics: C3 - Percent Sorties, C4 - Percent Unsched-
uled Maintenance, C6 - Percent Not Mission Capable due to Supply (NMCS), C15 -
Achieved Sorties / Day / AC, C16 - Flying Hours, and C17 - Average Flying Hours
/ AC / Day.
The two sample confidence intervals for the C-Statistics for the baseline and mod-
ified models were plotted next to each other to perform a visual test to see if there
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Table 2. C-Statistics: Aircraft Statistics
DESCRIPTION ITEM
BASE AVG ±
HW
MOD AVG ±
HW
DIFF AVG ±
HW
PCT SORTIES JSF at A 24.469 ± 0.185 27.421 ± 0.366 2.952 ± 0.409
PCT SORTIES JSF at B 25.367 ± 0.239 28.057 ± 0.37 2.69 ± 0.44
PCT UNSCHED
MAINTENANCE
JSF at A 19.777 ± 0.309 21.363 ± 0.339 1.586 ± 0.458
PCT UNSCHED
MAINTENANCE
JSF at B 20.121 ± 0.316 21.625 ± 0.379 1.504 ± 0.493
PCT NMCS JSF at A 4.503 ± 1.114 6.136 ± 1.072 1.633 ± 1.544
PCT NMCS JSF at B 5.906 ± 1.353 6.629 ± 1.103 0.723 ± 1.743
ACHIEVED SORTIES /
AC / DAY
JSF at A 2.347 ± 0.018 2.63 ± 0.035 0.283 ± 0.039
ACHIEVED SORTIES /
AC / DAY
JSF at B 2.286 ± 0.022 2.529 ± 0.034 0.243 ± 0.04
FLYING HOURS JSF at A 4228.182 ± 31.999 4738.319 ± 63.172 510.137 ± 70.712
FLYING HOURS JSF at B 4383.431 ± 41.26 4848.256 ± 63.971 464.825 ± 76.012
AVG. FLYING
HOURS / AC / DAY
JSF at A 5.872 ± 0.044 6.581 ± 0.088 0.709 ± 0.098
AVG. FLYING
HOURS / AC / DAY
JSF at B 6.088 ± 0.057 6.734 ± 0.089 0.646 ± 0.105
Figure 4. C6 - Percent NMCS
was a difference between the two models at each FOB. As illustrated in Figure 4,
the confidence interval bounds for the C6 metric had overlapping confidence interval
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bounds, but for the remaining C-Statistics, the baseline model did not overlap the
modified models. So, we can say the the models are statistically different at both
locations for C3, C4, C15, C16 and C17. However, based solely on a visual test of
the confidence interval plots, we cannot conclude the C6 metric shows significant or
insignificant differences at both locations. Therefore, we conducted a two sample
t-test to compare the difference in means; the mean and halfwidth can be found in
the last column in Table 2.
The results from the t-tests conclude a significant difference in the means for the
C6 metric at FOB A, but not at FOB B. This result could be attributed to the
difference in sortie lengths between location A and B due to their different distances
from the opposing force. The longer duration of sorties at FOB B causes a larger
mean and variance for NMCS, as well as the other C-Statistics. Table 2 displays these
larger values at FOB B when compared to FOB A.
If the confidence intervals for the difference of means in the last column of Table
2 included zero, such as C6 at location B, there would not be sufficient information
to prove the models are statistically different. However, we can confidently say that
differences in means of the remaining eleven metrics between these two models is
statistically significant.
Although a majority of the C-Statistics are statistically significant, the next ques-
tions is if a practical difference exists. The difference between the baseline and mod-
ified models for the percent of time aircraft spent flying sortie tasks (C3) was 2.952
and 2.69 for FOBs A and B, respectively. This equates to an extra 21.25 flying hours
per aircraft at FOB A and 19.37 flying hours per aircraft at FOB B during the first 30
day period of surge operations. This result can also be found by changing the units
for the C15, C16 and C17 metrics. Within the baseline total flying hours per aircraft
during surge operations, it is expected that three JSF parts fail per aircraft at both
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FOB A and B. To clarify, these are three parts failing out of the list of JSF parts
modeled in LCOM ATK, not just the JSF engine and its modules. This data was
found from the failure clocks within the LCOM ATK code in the scenario created by
Lockheed Martin. With the increase of approximately 20 flying hours per aircraft at
each location throughout the first 30 days, the number of JSF parts expected to fail
increases to 5 JSF parts; once again, not to be confused with the JSF engine modules.
The expected number of part failures increases by two parts for each of the 24 aircraft
at both locations, so a total of 96 additional JSF parts would be required just during
the first 30 day surge period. This increase in percent sorties and flying hours causes
ramifications on sortie operations and can significantly increase the amount of parts
required for this JSF scenario. Note that the JSF data provided only models to the
line-replaceable unit (LRU) level of total JSF parts within LCOM ATK.
In addition to the extra flying hours, the increase of more than 1.5% of unscheduled
maintenance for both locations results in an increase of almost 11 hours of additional
time aircraft spend in maintenance. This averages to an additional thirty minutes of
unscheduled maintenance per aircraft for the duration of the 30 day surge operation.
As an average, the additional thirty minutes does not seem detrimental, but it is
possible that an aircraft spends an hour or more for unscheduled maintenance in a
single day. This could significantly affect sortie operations on that day. Additionally,
this extra 11 hours of unscheduled maintenance causes more stress on the maintenance
squadrons with a possible need for members to work overtime.
Table 3. D-Statistics: Personnel Statistics
DESCRIPTION ITEM
BASE AVG ±
HW
MOD AVG ±
HW
DIFF AVG ±
HW
MANHOURS USED AVG at A 227.698 ± 1.391 251.301 ± 2.759 23.604 ± 3.085
MANHOURS USED AVG at B 229.216 ± 1.670 249.122 ± 3.227 19.906 ± 3.628
The data for the metrics pertaining to the maintenance personnel is displayed in
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Table 3. The table contains data for the metric D3 - Manhours Used. This statistic
consists of the outputs for the maintenance members across the eleven different Air
Force Specialty Codes (AFSC), which were averaged to consolidate the data. In order
to find this total average, the average number of manhours used was first found by
taking the total manhours used at each FOB and dividing it by 70, the number of
scheduled maintenance personnel during the first month. This average number of
manhours used was then averaged across the thirty replications and the grand mean
and standard deviation was computed from those thirty averages.
Similar to the C-Statistics, the means and halfwidths were calculated for the two
models and the difference in means. It is apparent there is a statistical difference
in the baseline and modified models because the difference in means two sample
confidence intervals do not contain zero at both FOB A and FOB B. We observed
a slightly larger increase at location A compared to location B and we can attribute
this to the extra ten minute sortie length at location B. This causes the aircraft at
FOB B to be on the ground ten minutes less per aircraft per sortie which decreases
the amount of time available for maintenance to spend working on aircraft at FOB
B.
The additional 24 manhour increase at FOB A and 20 manhour increase at FOB B
can impact the moral and effectiveness of a maintenance unit. This increase averages
to roughly 40 minutes extra work per day for each maintenance member for the first
30 days of surge operations. The 40 minute increase per day is just an average across
the AFSCs, but some AFSCs might be impacted more than others. We found the
maximum increase to be an hour and a half of additional work per day for the 2A3W3
AFSC (wheel and tire maintenance) throughout the first month of surge operations.
Table 4 displays all of the spare JSF engine parts for the F4 metric which represents
the number of units demanded for the entire duration of the 180 day logistics simula-
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tion. Initially, the number of spares demanded was observed for the first thirty days
similar to the other statistics. However, there weren’t enough JSF module failures
within the first thirty days to compare the baseline and modified models. Therefore,
we decided to evaluate the JSF module failures and their demanded spare parts over
the entire 180 day scenario. For reference, the JSF engine module parts and their
related part number designators in the code are displayed in Table 5.
Table 4. F-Statistics: Supply Statistics
DESCRIPTION ITEM
BASE AVG ±
HW
MOD AVG ±
HW
DIFF AVG ±
HW
NUMBER OF
UNITS DEMANDED
Nozzle at A 0.9 ± 0.42 1.233 ± 0.487 0.333 ± 0.642
NUMBER OF
UNITS DEMANDED
Augmenter at A 1.833 ± 0.597 2.4 ± 0.434 0.567 ± 0.737
NUMBER OF
UNITS DEMANDED
Fan at A 2.433 ± 0.516 3.267 ± 0.596 0.833 ± 0.787
NUMBER OF
UNITS DEMANDED
Power at A 3.733 ± 0.877 4.633 ± 0.743 0.9 ± 1.148
NUMBER OF
UNITS DEMANDED
Gear Box at A 0.267 ± 0.194 0.367 ± 0.23 0.1 ± 0.3
NUMBER OF
UNITS DEMANDED
Nozzle at B 0.933 ± 0.339 1.2 ± 0.397 0.267 ± 0.521
NUMBER OF
UNITS DEMANDED
Augmenter at B 1.9 ± 0.474 2.5 ± 0.634 0.6 ± 0.79
NUMBER OF
UNITS DEMANDED
Fan at B 2.4 ± 0.677 2.733 ± 0.74 0.333 ± 1.001
NUMBER OF
UNITS DEMANDED
Power at B 3.3 ± 0.673 4.9 ± 0.947 1.6 ± 1.161
NUMBER OF
UNITS DEMANDED
Gear Box at B 0.3 ± 0.223 0.067 ± 0.095 -0.233 ± 0.242
Table 5. JSF Engine Modules
Item Designator Reference Number Module Name
C7810010 1 Nozzle
C7851010 2 Augmenter
P7220010 3 Fan
P7230010 4 Power
P7260010 5 Gear Box
Each FOB was supplied with three spares for each of the five JSF engine modules.
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The ability to track JSF engine modules was not included in the original model
created by Lockheed Martin (which tracked complete JSF engines), but we modified
the model to incorporate and track the individual JSF engine module parts. Note
that the three spares for each of the engine modules corresponds to the three spare
full engines in the original JSF KPP data. The results from Table 4 indicate there
is a lack of evidence to prove a statistical difference for a majority of the nozzles,
augmenters, gear boxes, fans, and power modules demanded between the baseline
and modified models at both locations. However, there are two modules that were
statistically significant; the fan at FOB A and the power module at FOB B. On
average the modified model required 0.833 more fans at location A and 1.6 more
power modules at location B.
Although there is a statistical significance for the fan at FOB A and the power
module at FOB B, an additional part or two would not significantly impact the JSF
mission in this scenario nor vastly increase the amount of spares required at each
location.
Figure 5. F4 - Number of Units Demanded at FOB A (Modules 1-3)
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Figure 6. F4 - Number of Units Demanded at FOB B (Modules 1-3)
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the overlapping confidence intervals for the nozzles,
augmenters, and fans. Despite the overlap of confidence intervals, two sample t-
tests with an alpha of 0.05 must be conducted in order to determine the statistical
significance of the difference between the baseline and modified models. For example,
even though the confidence intervals overlap for the fan module at FOB A, there is a
statistically significant difference between the two models.
Additionally, Figures 7 and 8 show the overlapping confidence intervals for the
power modules and gear boxes. Once again, the overlapping confidence intervals for
the JSF engine modules cannot statistically conclude a lack of evidence for a signif-
icant difference between the two models. However, we can find the 95% confidence
intervals for the difference in means in the last column in Table 4 and see that they
include zero for all of the modules except the fan at FOB A and the power module
at FOB B.
Figures 9 and 10 display the confidence intervals for the five JSF engine modules
for the baseline and modified models by FOB. These plots help identify the differ-
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Figure 7. F4 - Number of Units Demanded at FOB A (Modules 4-5)
Figure 8. F4 - Number of Units Demanded at FOB B (Modules 4-5)
ences in mean and variance between the different JSF engine modules at each FOB.
Additionally, these plots show that the nozzle and gear box modules have the smallest
variance at both locations compared to the confidence interval widths for the aug-
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menter, fan and power modules. This information provides insight to maintenance
commanders about which JSF engine modules are more volatile and which fluctuate
less. The spares with less variance provide more confidence for a commander when
buying spare parts. Alternatively, wider confidence intervals portray a potential for
an increased number of spares parts necessary for the JSF mission.
Figure 9. F4 - Number of Units Demanded (Baseline Model)
Originally, we looked at multiple supply metrics to include with our first analysis
to help understand the entire JSF spare engine module process and see the potential
impacts of increased OPSTEMPO on spare parts. However, we chose not to include
information about the F3 metric (Number of Backorder Days) and other supply statis-
tics because the LCOM ATK model scenario did not fully include logic to track the
number of backorder days for the individual JSF engine module parts. Despite only
having one supply statistics to analyze, the effects of the F3 metric can be related to
observed changes with the C6 statistic (Not Mission Capable due to Supply).
Another insight gained from this part of the analysis were the differences between
location A and B. As mentioned in Chapter 3, FOB B is further away from the Red
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Figure 10. F4 - Number of Units Demanded (Modified Model)
Force location, so the sorties flown from FOB B follow a uniform distribution that is
ten minutes longer than the uniform distribution for FOB A. With longer sorties at
location B, we expected there to be higher outputs in the C-Statistics for the percent
of time sorties are being flown (C3), percent unscheduled maintenance (C4), percent
of aircraft not mission capable due to supply (C6), flying hours (C16), and the average
flying hours per aircraft per day (C17). Due to longer sortie durations, we expected
lower observed values for the number of achieved sorties per aircraft per day (C15).
Table 2 is consistent with our expectations with higher numbers for C3, C4, C6, C16
and C17, in addition to lower outputs for C15.
For the D and F-Statistics we expected relatively similar outputs for location A
and B, with a slight increase in the outputs for location B. The observed values in
Table 3 show very similar outputs for locations A and B, as expected. In the modified
model it is interesting to see less manhours used in location B compared to location A.
We attribute that to the increased amount of time a JSF spends in the air compared
to their time on the ground. The results in Table 4 confirm our expectations of similar
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results for both FOB A and B.
From the results of our first analysis, we deemed the following statistics the most
interesting for further exploration: C4 - Percent Unscheduled Maintenance, C6 -
Percent NMCS, C17 - Average Flying Hours / AC / Day, and D3 - Manhours Used.
4.2 Experimental Design
We created a full factorial set of experiments to assess the way three factors
impacted key MOEs over the full 180 day simulation period. For the design of ex-
periments we chose three factors: the number of spare JSF engine module parts,
number of maintenance personnel, and the sortie duration. We chose two levels for
each factor, high and low settings.
The number of spare JSF engine module parts for the high level (baseline) consists
of three spare parts and the low setting drops these spares to one part. Due to a lower
than expected use of JSF spare module parts in our baseline model, we use this lower
setting design point for spare JSF engine modules. For the low level (baseline),
the number of maintenance personnel follows the first analysis with the scheduled
number of members assigned to the eleven different AFSC positions. The high level
schedules an additional member to each of the AFSCs, allowing for eleven more
maintenance personnel to work on aircraft. Finally, for the low level (baseline), the
sortie duration is selected by a uniform distribution between 142.5 minutes and 157.5
minutes for aircraft at FOB A and a uniform distribution between 152.5 minutes and
167.5 minutes for aircraft at FOB B. The high level increases the distribution for the
sortie duration by twenty percent for aircraft at both locations.
A design matrix was created to show all possible combinations of high and low
levels for each input factor. These high and low levels can be generically coded as
+1 and -1, respectively. This design matrix, as well as the responses to each of the
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settings, can be found in Table 6. C4 - Percent Unscheduled Maintenance, C6 -
Percent NMCS, C17 - Average Flying Hours / AC / Day, and D3 - Manhours Used
were the chosen MOEs for this part of our analysis. The results for each of the
responses was found by running LCOM ATK for each of the eight settings or design
points shown in Table 6, with the baseline settings in bold. These baseline results
are not equivalent to the results from the modified model in the first study because
the first study analyzes the 30 day surge operation where the experimental design
explores the effects over the entire 180 day surge, seize and sustainment periods.
Table 6. DOE Results
# Spares # MX
Sortie
Duration
PCT UNSCHED
MAINTENANCE
PCT NMCS
AVG. FLYING
HRS/AC/DAY
MANHOURS
USED
1 1 -1 11.36 ± 0.08 9.85 ± 0.29 2.823 ± 0.013 139273 ± 612
-1 1 -1 11.29 ± 0.09 10.29 ± 0.31 2.808 ± 0.013 138400 ± 668
1 -1 -1 11.72 ± 0.06 9.39 ± 0.28 2.793 ± 0.012 137002 ± 543
1 1 1 12.55 ± 0.1 11.31 ± 0.33 3.134 ± 0.01 145051 ± 571
-1 -1 -1 11.68 ± 0.08 9.99 ± 0.3 2.782 ± 0.011 136852 ± 542
-1 1 1 12.55 ± 0.09 12.14 ± 0.32 3.118 ± 0.013 144650 ± 592
1 -1 1 12.96 ± 0.08 11.05 ± 0.34 3.082 ± 0.011 140673 ± 558
-1 -1 1 12.86 ± 0.1 11.41 ± 0.35 3.068 ± 0.012 140031 ± 701
As a result of using the entire 180 days for the second analysis, there are large
differences between baseline design point in the third line of Table 6 and the modified
model’s outputs from the 30 day analysis back in Table 2 and 3 (column 3) from
the first analysis. When comparing the two analyses, the percent of unscheduled
maintenance decreases by about 50%. The JSF mission flies surge operations for 30
days and flies seize and sustainment operations for 150 days. Due to the lower sortie
rates and the larger percent of time in the sustainment period, the average percent
of unscheduled maintenance decreases. The percent NMCS increases after the initial
30 days causing the total percent NMCS for the 180 days to increase by roughly
3-4%. This inflation of percent NMCS is caused by more JSF parts failing because
of the cumulative hours flown on each JSF. The average flying hours per aircraft
per day remained fairly constant between the two time periods, but the number of
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manhours changed drastically between the two tables. This is attributed mainly to
the combination of the two locations manhours and the the additional 150 days of
manhours added to the initial 30 day surge period. Despite the differences between
the two analyses, we believe the different chosen time periods help answer the primary
questions for this research.
The LCOM ATK scenarios were run for thirty replications at each design point,
resulting in a total of 240 runs. Similar to the first analysis, the data from LCOM
ATK was output into a comma delimited text file. This text file was imported into
a workbook in Microsoft Excel to organize the data for a clean import to JMP, a
computer program created as a tool to be used for expert data analysis, design of
experiments, and Six Sigma implementation. In order to find the effects of the three
factors on the four response variables, a model was created in JMP for each MOE.
The goal of this part of our analysis is to gain insight on how the factors impact the
responses, not to find the best factor level setting. For each of the models, a response
consisting of values from the 240 runs was used for y-variable and the x-variable
consisted of the first order factors and their interaction terms.
The Adjusted R-Square values from two of the four models were not as high as
we would expect and the residuals were not normally distributed. The low Adjusted
R-Square value suggests there are other factors that were not included in those two
models that are also important to the responses. However, we were able to draw
insight from the models and answer our primary focus question for this analysis
that was “which factors significantly impacted the responses?”. We are not using
the parameter estimates provided by the outputs from the JMP models to indicate
or predict the amount each significant factor affects the responses. Rather, we use
the parameter estimates to draw insight to which direction, positive or negative, the
significant factors influence the MOEs and on what order of magnitude the response
37
changes in comparison to other significant factors in the model.
Tables 7 and 8 summarize the results from the first model (Adjusted R-square
of 0.89) which analyzes the percent unscheduled maintenance response. The results
from the ANOVA table suggest that the model explains a significant amount of the
variation in the data. The number of maintenance personnel and sortie duration were
significant factors for the first model.
Table 7. C4 Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 7 96.12 13.7321 265.2645
Error 232 12.01 0.0518 Prob >F
Total 239 108.13 <.0001*
The number of maintenance personnel decreased the unscheduled maintenance
response, but the sortie duration increased the unscheduled maintenance more than
the magnitude of # MX, as shown in Table 8. Compared to the number of avail-
able maintenance personnel, sortie duration caused more than triple the change in
response and resulted in the most significant impact on the percent of unscheduled
maintenance. Intuitively, this makes sense because as sortie durations increase, the
number of unexpected maintenance requirements to include JSF engine failures is
expected to rise as well.
Table 8. C4 Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob >|t|
Intercept 12.12 0.015 825.22 <.0001*
# Spares 0.03 0.015 1.84 0.068
# MX -0.18 0.015 -12.33 <.0001*
# Spares* # MX -0.01 0.015 -0.65 0.513
Sortie Duration 0.61 0.015 41.23 <.0001*
# Spares*Sortie Duration -0.001 0.015 -0.06 0.950
# MX*Sortie Duration 0.003 0.015 0.24 0.812
# Spares*# MX*Sortie Duration -0.02 0.015 -1.16 0.248
The results from the second model, which analyzes the percent NMCS, are orga-
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nized in Tables 9 and 10. This is one of the two models with lower Adjusted R-Square
values (R-square of 0.5134), due to the random error’s large contribution to the total
sum of squares. However, from our mean squares and the F-Ratio, this model has
a p-value of <0.0001 which suggests the model explains a significant amount of the
variation in the data.
Table 9. C6 Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 7 187.96 26.8521 37.0278
Error 232 168.24 0.7252 Prob >F
Total 239 356.21 <.0001*
The number of JSF engine spare modules, the number of maintenance teams and
sortie duration were significant factors that affected the percent NMCS, as shown in
Table 10. The number of available spares at the FOBs decreased the percent NMCS,
but an increase in sortie duration increased the percent NMCS almost four times
more than the negative effect from increasing the number of JSF spares.
Table 10. C6 Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob >|t|
Intercept 10.69 0.055 194.41 <.0001*
# Spares -0.28 0.055 -5.17 <.0001*
# MX 0.21 0.055 3.87 0.0001*
# Spares* # MX -0.03 0.055 -0.62 0.539
Sortie Duration 0.81 0.055 14.66 <.0001*
# Spares*Sortie Duration -0.03 0.055 -0.47 0.642
# MX*Sortie Duration 0.02 0.055 0.39 0.698
# Spares*# MX*Sortie Duration -0.07 0.055 -1.31 0.192
As the sortie duration increases, we expect the number of total JSF failures to
increase as well, causing the percent NMCS to increase. It also makes sense that the
percent NMCS decreases if we allocate more spare JSF engine modules to the FOBs,
because aircraft are repaired more quickly (but only for engine module failures).
However, its isn’t obvious why adding one member to each of the AFSCs causes
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an increase in the percent NMCS at roughly the same magnitude as the number
of spares. We believe this is due to the decrease in not mission capable due to
maintenance (NMCM), which causes the total percent not mission capable to consist
of more NMCS. In other words, some of the NMCM shifted to the NMCS.
The third model presents results with how we expected the three factors to affect
average flying hours per aircraft per day. These JMP outputs are organized in Tables
11 and 12. The results found in Table 11 suggest that the model explains a statistically
significant amount of the variation in the data with an Adjusted R-square value of
0.9574.
Table 11. C17 Repsonse: Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 7 5.481 0.783 768.789
Error 232 0.236 0.001 Prob >F
Total 239 5.7168410 <.0001*
As shown in Table 12, the number of spare JSF parts, number of maintenance
personnel and sortie duration were significant factors that positively affected the C17
response. The number of spares and maintenance personnel affected the response
roughly the same, but the parameter estimate associated with sortie duration was
twenty-one times that of the number of spares and almost eight times the coefficient
for number of maintenance personnel. This is exactly what we expect because, as the
number of spares and maintenance personnel increase, maintenance on aircraft take
less time allowing for more sorties to be flown. This would also increase the ratio
of time in the air versus time on the ground. It is intuitive to the casual observer
that sortie duration is highly correlated with the number of flying hours, so if the
sortie length was increased by twenty percent there should be a significant impact
to the average flying hours per aircraft per day. Another significant variable is the
interaction term between # MX and sortie duration. This result suggests a greater
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increase in average flying hours per aircraft per day if both # MX and sortie duration
are at their high levels compared to the increase with only one high level factor.
Table 12. C17 Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob >|t|
Intercept 2.95 0.002 1432.5 <.0001*
# Spares 0.007 0.002 3.39 0.0008*
# MX 0.02 0.002 9.69 <.0001*
# Spares* # MX 0.0007 0.002 0.35 0.724
Sortie Duration 0.15 0.002 72.58 <.0001*
# Spares*Sortie Duration 0.0005 0.002 0.24 0.807
# MX*Sortie Duration 0.006 0.002 2.91 0.0039*
# Spares*# MX*Sortie Duration -0.0004 0.002 -0.20 0.842
The last model analyzed the effects of the factors on the number of manhours and
the results are displayed in Tables 13 and 14. From the sum of squares, we calculate
the Adjusted R-square value to be 0.7686. With a p-value less than 0.0001 in Table
13, we can conclude that this model explains a statistically significant amount of the
variation in the data. D3 is the output statistic for the number of manhours used,
so we assume more maintenance personnel would show the most prominent increase
in manhours used and an increase in sortie duration would also result in a higher
number of manhours used.
Table 13. D3 Repsonse: Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 7 2073965405 296280772 114.416
Error 232 600764578 2589502.5 Prob >F
Total 239 2674729984 <.0001*
Table 14 confirms these assumptions with significant estimates for both the num-
ber of maintenance personnel and sortie duration. The number of spares was also a
significant factor, but it did not impact this MOE nearly as much as the other two
factors. The last significant variable is the interaction term between # MX and sortie
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duration. This indicates that there is an even more significant increase in manhours
used if both # MX and sortie duration are increased together.
Table 14. D3 Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob >|t|
Intercept 140233.85 103.87 1350.1 <.0001*
# Spares 266.05 103.87 2.56 0.0111*
# MX 1609.49 103.87 15.49 <.0001*
# Spares* # MX 52.62 103.87 0.51 0.613
Sortie Duration 2352.08 103.87 22.64 <.0001*
# Spares*Sortie Duration 10.13 103.87 0.10 0.922
# MX*Sortie Duration 654.76 103.87 6.30 <.0001*
# Spares*# MX*Sortie Duration -128.20 103.87 -1.23 0.218
In all of the four models, the first order terms were the most significant factors
in the model. This can be explained by the sparsity of effects principle which states
that systems are usually dominated by main effects and low-order interactions. From
this analysis we were able to identify the significant factors that influenced the four
different MOEs we chose to analyze.
4.3 Summary
This analysis provides insight to realistic capabilities and limitations of Blue Forces
and can be used by a commander before a wargame begins to help them make more
informed decisions during a wargame. The first sub-section of our research uses
statistical analysis with plots, two sample t-tests, and 95% confidence intervals to
show that there was statistically more strain on the JSF mission in the modified
model when compared to the baseline model. The modified model resulted in higher
percentages for unscheduled maintenance and NMCS, as well as a large increase in the
number of manhours used. Our second analysis conducted an experimental design
to pinpoint important factors that impact key MOEs. We found the statistically
significant factors were the number of spares, number of maintenance personnel, and
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the length of sorties. This analysis provides essential insight to these factors that are
key in capturing ACS through our selected MOEs. Both of these analyses contributed
to a proof of concept that it is plausible for a logistics simulation to be run before a
wargame and that a logistics simulation is vital for a more realistic and holistic view
of Blue Force capabilities during a wargame.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Conclusions of Research
This thesis utilized a preexisting model created in LCOM ATK as a basis for
analysis. With modifications to the scenario created by Lockheed Martin, a baseline
scenario was created with two FOBs that conducted JSF sorties for 180 days to sim-
ulate a long duration wargame. The sorties followed a flight schedule that captured a
seven day surge period, a twenty three day seize period and 150 days of sustainment
operations. This flight schedule was created to mirror the expectations in the JSF
KPPs. This research explored a more prolonged wargame scenario by examining the
effects of elongating the surge operation to thirty days. This heightened OPSTEMPO
strained the JSF mission and its maintenance support. We found statistically signifi-
cant increases in the percent of time flying sorties, percent unscheduled maintenance,
the amount of flying hours and sorties per aircraft, and the number of manhours
required to maintain the JSF squadrons. We do not track fuel or ammunition in
our study as opposed to the research done by Captain Daniel Krievs [5], but clearly
there would be more demand for both in this JSF scenario. The results of this study
clearly show a need for increased levels of ACS during even a relatively short exten-
sion of surge operations. The significantly different aircraft statistics are illustrated
in Figures 11, 12, and the significantly different manpower statistic in Figure 13.
The increase in the percent of time aircraft fly sorties with our heightened OP-
STEMPO adds about twenty flying hours per aircraft over the first thirty days. This
increase is illustrated in Figure 11. The average achieved sorties per aircraft per day
for the baseline scenario was a little more than two sorties per day and the mod-
ified model showed an increase to 2.6 sorties per day. This increase in sorties for
twenty-four aircraft at two locations requires an additional twelve to thirteen sorties
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Figure 11. C3 - Percent Time Flying Sorties
per day. That equates to almost 400 more sorties between the two locations just
within the first 30 days of the wargame scenario. This vast increase in the number of
sorties and flying hours places a significant amount of stress on JSF parts and results
in more failures and unscheduled maintenance. The increase in percent unscheduled
maintenance is illustrated by the confidence intervals in Figure 12.
The increase in the total number of manhours adds about 150 manhours with our
modified scenario at each FOB over the first thirty days. This increase requires an
additional five hours of work on average per day across the eleven AFSCs. This large
increase in the number of manhours required at the two FOBs places a significant
amount of stress on maintenance personnel and could possibly result in degraded
job performance and squadron moral. The increase in maintenance manhours is
illustrated by the confidence intervals in Figure 13.
In order to mitigate the potential issues with constraints on Blue Forces, this re-
search found significant factors which impact the aforementioned increased responses.
The number of available spare JSF parts, number of maintenance personnel scheduled
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Figure 12. C4 - Percent Unscheduled Maintenance
Figure 13. D3 - Manhours Used
at the FOBs, and the length of the sorties were significant factors which effected these
responses. There are definitely other factors which influence the responses, but our
analysis provided insight on how the factors modeled influence operation in a LDLW.
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This research found that increasing the number of spare JSF parts available at the
FOBs significantly decreased the percent of aircraft NCMS and allowed the aircraft
to fly more hours per day, on average. Increasing the number of maintenance per-
sonnel scheduled to be working at each location significantly decreased the percent of
aircraft requiring unscheduled maintenance and allowed the aircraft to fly more hours
each day, on average. Additionally, if there are sorties that require a higher level
of engagement with opposing forces or are scheduled for missions further away from
the FOBs, we saw a significant increase in the percent of unscheduled maintenance,
the percent of aircraft NMCS, the average flying hours per aircraft per day, and the
number of manhours required to maintain the JSF squadrons. Sortie duration was
the most influential parameter in each of the four models, so in a more prolonged war
with a higher OPSTEMPO we would expect a significant increase in the amount of
JSF spares required and the amount of time our airmen spend maintaining the JSF
engines to enable the sustainment rate of sorties for the JSF mission.
These results are starkly similar to those of Captain Krievs who found, through
multivariate analysis, that the keys to capturing ACS are the number of spares, num-
ber of maintenance crews, ammunition, and fuel [5]. This study did not incorporate
fuel or ammunition, but clearly they would be significant parameters that affect the
MOEs.
5.2 Recommendations for Future Research
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics proposed an idea that a repair network
should accomplish the Intermediate-level and Depot-level maintenance and repair of
aircraft. RAND conducted analysis of a repair network in 2010 to address this issue.
They analyzed the efficiency of establishing Central Repair Facilities (CRFs) within
a repair network, particularly concentrating on manpower utilization. Additionally,
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the LDLW workshop conducted by AFMC/A4F did include RNI and contributed
to the initial foundation of incorporating RNI into logistics simulations. The studies
conducted by RAND, the LDLW workshop, and the results from this thesis provide an
opportunity for future work with RNI in LCOM ATK. The conclusions of this research
pave a pathway to discovering the impact of RNI compared to traditionally modeled
repairs. Introducing RNI to LCOM ATK would open many doors to further analyze
the maintenance procedure and its impact on a long duration logistics wargame.
In addition to introducing RNI to a logistics wargame, future work could focus
on the logic within LCOM ATK with respect to individual spare JSF engine module
parts, similar to the LDLW workshop conducted by AFMC/A4F and FTI.
5.3 Summary
Wargames were originally created to test war time strategies against opposing
forces within a short time frame. Due to the short duration design of these wargames,
logistics were deemed irrelevant and it was incorrectly assumed that the warfighter
would be logistically supported for the entire duration of the wargame. The purpose
of this thesis is to provide insight to the value of capturing logistics within a combat
model or wargame and to better quantify and model a scenario with an increased
requirement for ACS. An imperative piece to wargames is logistics because it pro-
vides a more accurate representation of Blue Force capabilities and constraints and
yields key insight to the logistical ramifications of war time decisions for commanders.
Incorporating logistics in wargames provides a more holistic view of a war and can
be the crucial addition to wargames that helps the USAF maintain dominance in air,
space, and cyberspace.
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